

TerRa

Terrorism and Radicalisation



Prevention, De-radicalisation & Citizenship

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Evidence-based Policy Advice

Final Report

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Executive Summary

The aim of this report was to provide evidence-based advice to inform European counter-extremism policies.

In a preceding needs assessment, we identified four good practices across Europe that served as a basis for this report: the Dutch Integration Policy, the UK's Prevent Strategy, the Danish Aarhus Model and the German Exit and Hayat programmes.

We analysed these four good practices, created blueprints of their structures and merged them into one comprehensive framework that can be implemented by European policymakers.

To achieve this, we used a combination of in-depth literature research, site visits, expert interviews and our own experience to provide a rigorous analysis of the functioning and success factors of the selected good practices.

The blueprints of the four good practices highlight their key success elements and make them compatible with each other and transferable to other countries' political, cultural and demographic contexts.

On the basis of all assessed evidence, we developed both general guidelines for setting up a counter-extremism framework that is suited to address today's challenges and concrete advice on the development and implementation of a holistic counter-extremism approach which incorporates elements from all four good practices.

Below is a summary of the general guidelines that were derived from our desk-based research and our site visits. These guidelines provide evidence-based advice regarding strategy, structure, key partners and tactics, all of which are crucial factors to be considered when designing a counter-extremism policy.

Strategy

- Take a full-spectrum approach
- Tackle the sources of extremism
- Facilitate multi-agency cooperation
- Link online and offline counter-extremism
- Support the grassroots
- Guarantee transparency, accountability and human rights
- Communicate successes

Structure

- De-politicise
- De-securitise
- Localise
- Internationalise

Key partners

- Build public-private partnerships
- Empower frontline workers and families
- Encourage youth-led initiatives

Tactics

- Learn from best practices abroad
- Innovate with evidence-base
- Stay flexible and proactive

These general guidelines should form the basis for any counter-extremism framework.

Below we outline the holistic counter-extremism framework that we designed, using the four pillars provided by our good practices: a national integration and community cohesion policy, a national strategy to targeted prevention and early intervention, a local counter-extremism and reintegration approach and grassroots deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes.


- 1.) An effective integration and community cohesion policy can prevent societal estrangement of immigrants and support a positive social context, which is by its very nature resilient to the message of radical groups.
- 2.) A comprehensive national counter-extremism policy that emphasises targeted prevention and early intervention can deter vulnerable individuals from being radicalised and allow for early detection and disruption of the radicalisation process.
- 3.) A local strategy to prevent vulnerable community members from joining extremist networks and to deradicalise and reintegrate radicalised individuals and returning fighters can complement national counter-extremism efforts.

- 4.) Grassroots programmes can work closely with families of radicalised individuals to provide both psychological and practical support for their disengagement and rehabilitation.

These complementary elements of our holistic counter-extremism framework are visualised in the ring model below.

We believe that the evidence-based advice provided in this report can inspire the development and contribute to the effective implementation of a coherent overall approach to counter-extremism across Europe. While the framework is broad enough to allow for each country to adjust it to local contexts, it provides policymakers with a strategic road map that is rooted in evidence.

While we have illustrated potential scope of a comprehensive programme, future research could focus on the concrete steps to implement each of the four elements of our framework in specific cultural and political environments.



Introduction

Context

The large-scale attacks in Paris and Brussels have shown more clearly than ever that we cannot afford un-coordinated counter-extremism approaches across the EU anymore. We need to act quickly and in a consistent way to jointly address the rising levels of both Islamist and far-right extremism. In the past decade counter-extremism efforts have often been duplicated, mistakes have been repeated and there have been substantial time lags in the adoption of effective policies because governments did not look at all the initiatives that happened beyond their countries' borders.

As a result, many countries are lagging behind in their responses to the rising levels of extremism. Radicalisation referral systems are an example of how much time it sometimes takes states to adopt counter-extremism policies that had been effective in other EU countries for several years, if not decades: Britain's Channel referral system has been in place since 2007. France only created a counselling centre and a telephone hotline¹ in 2014, the Dutch launched their Radicalisation Hotline² in 2015, and Belgium is still in the process of developing one.³

In order to effectively address the growing terrorism threat all European governments need to be on the same page when it comes to what works and what does not in countering extremism and preventing terrorism. It is absolutely crucial that policy makers do not waste time and money in efforts to reinvent the wheel when, in fact, there are good practices across Europe that they can learn from. While Britain has developed the world's most comprehensive, governmental counter-extremism strategy and the Dutch are considered to have one of the best integration policies, there have been various, great grassroots projects in other European countries that we can learn from.

Research Aim

TERRA II is a European project, funded by DG Home Affairs and running from August 2014 to August 2016. It is a follow up project to TERRA I (2012 -2014, also funded by the European Commission DG Home Affairs), which produced the TERRA toolkit, a European resource for frontline working with populations which may be vulnerable to radicalisation.

TERRA II is built upon three pillars. First, a train-the-trainer manual has been delivered to Spain, the Netherlands and the UK, so that the knowledge gathered in the TERRA toolkit can

¹ Ministère de l'Intérieur (2014): 'Lancement d'une plateforme d'assistance aux familles et de prévention de radicalisation violente', 2014, <http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Archives/Archives-des-actualites/2014/Dispositif-de-lutte-contre-les-filieres-djihadistes>.

² New York Times (2015): 'Fear of Youth Radicalization Leads to New Helpline', 5 January 2015, <http://www.nytimes.nl/2015/01/05/fear-youth-radicalization-leads-new-helpline/>.

³ RTL (2016): 'Nous avons testé le numéro vert anti-radicalisation créé pour les prof: les choses sont loin d'être au point', 22 January 2016, <http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/societe/nous-avons-teste-le-numero-vert-anti-radicalisation-cree-pour-les-profs-les-choses-sont-loin-d-etre-au-point-788560.aspx>.

be disseminated directly to the frontline workers who will be using it in their daily work. Second, a citizenship curriculum has been developed and is being delivered to secondary school students in the Netherlands, to stimulate active citizenship and awareness of democratic means of resolving differences of opinion. Third, this evidence-based policy advice has been developed to support national policy makers in dealing with the complex context which can breed and foster radicalisation.

TERRA's evidence-based policy advice is based upon two strands. First, TERRA's literature review was updated and tailored to answer the most pressing questions that policy makers are currently facing in regards to radicalisation. Second, evidence was gathered from the four current practices named as best practices during the TERRA needs assessment conducted in March 2015.

During our needs assessment, we asked policy makers, practitioners, victims of terrorism and former radicals for examples of good practice in preventing and tackling radicalisation and extremism in Europe. Responses from the participants in the needs assessment identified four good practices from within Europe – the Danish Aarhus model from Denmark, the Prevent strategy from the UK, the integration strategy in place in the Netherlands and the Exit and Hayat programmes working in Germany.

Based on these results, TERRA conducted both desk and field research on these four programmes. The purpose of this research was to gain a better understanding of their approach, their working methods and the reasons for their effectiveness. Our research was designed to deliver a blueprint of their structure, so as to offer a basic design that could be implemented in other European countries.

Methodology

Desk research consisted of a literature review, gathering academic articles, documents published by the programmes themselves and, where relevant, policy papers relating to the policies which were named. A preliminary literature search was carried out by the Cogis library, searching for the names of the programmes and policies themselves. The selected documents were screened and read by TERRA researchers, and a skeleton description of the programme or policy was derived from this basis.

Field research was then carried out, during which one TERRA researcher visited each project or central location of the policy, and interviewed a selection of professionals involved in its implementation. We interviewed policy makers and advisors about each of the four good practices. During our Aarhus, Prevent and Exit/Hayat site visits, we furthermore consulted people directly involved in implementing the programmes themselves or the activities deriving from the policies. In Berlin we also interviewed a beneficiary of the Exit programme, though those benefitting from the Hayat programme were deemed either too vulnerable or too security sensitive to be interviewed.

Interviewees gave us precious insights into the functioning of the programmes and policies on a daily basis, potential obstacles to their successful implementation, their desired impact, their actual impact, and their needs to function optimally.

Structure

This document consists of three main sections:

1. **A literature overview:** This part offers insights into recent academic discussions and findings surrounding the topic of radicalisation and extremism. It serves as the theoretical backbone for our evidence-based policy advice.
2. **Four site visit reports:** This part provides a description and analysis of the essential elements of these four programmes, along with further information relevant to their introduction and implementation in other European countries, such as, where relevant, a brief description of the profiles of staff involved in the programmes.
3. **Key findings and policy advice.** This part summarises all findings and provides recommendations on the basis of our literature research, our experience and our site visits. It also offers a suggestion as to how the four selected good practices could work together and complement one another to provide a holistic response to radicalisation at policy and implementation level.

Our goal in providing this information is to offer the expertise contained within these four good practises in a format which can inspire new, effective trends and approaches to preventing and tackling radicalisation throughout Europe.

Literature Review

This literature review looks into the most recent literature on this subject, building on the original TERRA literature review which was conducted under the first TERRA project in 2013. The results of this updated review are presented in brief form here. If you would like to access both the original literature review and the full version of this updated review, along with its bibliography, it is available on www.terratoolkit.eu.

The literature review was designed to capture relevant insights from the most recent literature pertaining to themes relevant to policy makers at national level. It set out to answer three key questions:

- Are there new models of radicalisation which describe the process in a way which is relevant to policy makers?
- Have new insights emerged from recent literature to which, in the light of their relevance to prevention or tackling of radicalisation, special attention should be devoted?
- Are there, conversely, specific areas of policy which new literature show to have a radicalising effect upon populations and therefore require analysis and adjustment?

Its findings are divided into four main headings: **prevention**, approaches to **tackling radicalisation**, and **recovery and rehabilitation**.

New Models

In our 2013 review, we settled upon the Staircase to Terrorism model proposed in 2005 by Professor Fathali Moghaddam⁴ as a basis upon which to build the TERRA toolkit. Our new review did not unearth a new model which we see as preferable to the Staircase, but did encounter literature on the Quest for Significance model proposed in a series of articles by Kruglanski *et al*⁵, which provides a valuable complement to the Staircase. In it, the authors describe potential motivating factors which might lead an individual to radicalise. They focus upon the human need people have to feel that they are of importance – in essence, that they ‘matter.’ Various factors can threaten the sense that one matters – largely hinging upon humiliation in its various forms; discrimination, whether actual or perceived for example. An extreme group, they suggest, can offer a supreme chance to ‘matter,’ offering its followers the opportunity to participate in something greater than their own individual worth, and to carry out actions which they perceive as being of importance for the greater good of the group.

⁴ Moghaddam, F. M. (2005): ‘The Staircase To Terrorism: A Psychological Exploration’, *American Psychologist* Vol 60(2): 161-169

⁵ Dugas, M. and Kruglanski, A. (2014): ‘The Quest for Significance Model of Radicalization: Implications for the Management of Terrorist Detainees’ *Behavioral Sciences and the Law* 32: 423-439

Their model contains useful implications for policy makers, especially when discussing, for example, the incarceration of those convicted of a terrorist act. It will be included in our discussion.

Prevention

Stimulating resilience to radicalisation

Prevention is, in our view, the most valuable tool which policy makers in Europe have to hand. Stimulating resistance to radicalisation is a crucial element in prevention. This can be done in a variety of ways, but current European practices tend to focus upon stimulating individual resilience. This can be done by seeking to tackle and address individual characteristics which have been shown to have an influence upon rendering a person vulnerable to radicalisation – for example, issues surrounding integration or identity, or experiencing discrimination, both real or perceived. It is important to be aware that psychopathology is not necessarily associated in the literature with a higher risk of radicalisation – that is to say in layman’s terms that people who radicalise are not necessarily mentally ill.

Policy advice based upon these findings:

- Primary radicalisation prevention programmes should be implemented, as they provide a long term, durable approach which has the potential to tackle radicalisation at its roots.
- These policies and programmes should address and tackle the characteristics which might render those who possess them more vulnerable to radicalisation.
- It is crucial to recognise that not all people who radicalise are mentally ill. The problems which should be addressed by primary prevention programmes range from problems with identity to feelings of perceived group threat.
- Primary prevention programmes (such as Diamant and UCARE – see long version for details) could either build resilience throughout the general population or address individuals who have already displayed potential vulnerability for radicalisation.
- Further research – especially into the underlying mechanisms of radicalisation and the effects of primary prevention programmes, should be supported.

Tackling discrimination and addressing grievances

Experiencing discrimination and holding grievances are identified within the literature as a common factor which surfaces in the radicalisation process of many individuals. Because of this, we suggest that programmes and policies which tackle discrimination and seek to address grievances can work to strengthen the social fabric, increasing resilience to radicalisation at a general level. On a flip side of the same coin, some policies, which were ostensibly well intentioned, were in fact experienced as limiting and discriminatory in themselves. It is vital that policy makers are aware of this danger.

Policy advice on this subject:

- Make tackling discrimination a priority in national policy.
- Anti-discrimination measures should be embedded in broader social policy and not explicitly linked to radicalisation, with a view towards strengthening the social fabric and to avoid that these policies in themselves are seen as a negative identifier of ethnic and religious groups.
- Personal and political grievances are crucial aspects which can make people vulnerable for radicalisation. Policies which can contribute to these grievances should be avoided, and policies which address these grievances are recommended.
- While implementing well intended social initiatives, policy makers should additionally be aware that they can potentially negatively identify their target groups and unwittingly contribute to stigmatisation.

Constructive communication from governments

European governments today serve more ethnically and religiously diverse populations than ever before. The vocabulary which governments use to discuss their populations needs to be carefully chosen. Where once this diversity was celebrated as ‘vibrant,’ in recent years this lexicon has shifted, and some communications from governments can be seen to imply that some segments of society are sinister or suspect. This lexical minefield can be circumnavigated by steering as much as possible away from the multiculturalism model which has dominated European politics for the last years, and instead shifting towards a model of omniculturalism, emphasising not the differences between different ethnic and religious communities, but the similarities between them.

Policy advice:

- Care should be exercised in all communications from the government about the population, that ethnic and religious minorities are not singled out, negatively identified, nor labelled as suspicious, either explicitly nor implicitly.

Approach

Our updated literature review identified two recent strands of thought which were especially relevant to the discourse on suitable approach to radicalisation. The first is a natural continuation of our discourse on tackling discrimination – only in this instance, with a terrorist attack factored in.

The vicious circle of attack, discrimination, radicalisation, terrorism, attack

New literature has emerged in recent years identifying a social trend which can be seen as having a direct impact upon the likelihood of radicalisation in European countries. We have already noted that a link can be found between the experience of discrimination and the likelihood of radicalisation. Recently several authors have taken this link one step further, noting that instances of racism and discrimination rise following a terrorist attack. This leads us to conclude that there is a real danger in the aftermath of a terrorist attack of a vicious circle ensuing. The attack will prompt more racism against immigrant groups, and more

discriminatory behaviour. In turn, this experience of discrimination will, as we have seen, prompt greater vulnerability to radical narratives. This will cause an increase in recruitment to the radical cause. Some of the people who have radicalised in this way will progress up the Staircase to terrorism as expressed in Moghaddam's 2005 model and go on to commit terrorist acts, thereby engendering more discrimination, more radicalisation and so on.

Following a terrorist attack, populations look to their leaders to take action. Moghaddam and Breckenridge⁶ identify a phenomenon in which the population, once the shock of the attack begins to subside, can be positively mobilised to help fellow citizens in need and to support a return to normality, naming the phenomenon 'the post tragedy opportunity bubble.' Hegemann and Kahl⁷ describe a darker side to this moment, noting that governments, under pressure from the population to take action, can sometimes be seduced into ill-advised measures taken in haste to increase security after the fact, but often not based upon demonstrable effectiveness of the measures themselves.

For this reason, the response to terrorist acts from governments is crucial:

- Plans can usefully be made by governments before any attack has taken place as to how the post tragedy opportunity bubble, in which a great degree of energy and will comes from the general population to restore order and help those affected, could best be utilised. This cannot only be genuinely valuable in returning to normality – it can also help to improve community cohesion.
- Awareness about the vicious circle of discrimination, radicalisation and attack is important.
- Policies which are aimed at interrupting the vicious circle must tackle both of the parties which have a role in it, rather than just one of them – i.e. both the terrorist groups and groups which espouse hate and hate speech in society.
- In official communications following a terrorist attack, emphasis should be laid on the fact that the whole of society has been affected and damaged – not one specific group.
- In the case of an attack by an Islamist group, it is crucial that the Muslim organisations are vocal and public in their criticism of the attack.
- In the wake of a terrorist attack, authorities are particularly alert to discrimination, and public in attacking and denouncing it.

Extremist content online

Besides new insights into a vicious circle fuelling more radicalisation within Europe, significant attention has been paid to the wealth of readily accessible material which is available online. New literature describes how radical groups use the internet for multiple purposes – from raising awareness about their activities to fundraising and coordinating logistics for a terrorist attack. Several authors confirm that radicalisation processes can take place online – in some cases even solely online. However, authors also note the difficulty of

⁶ Moghaddam, F.M. and Breckenridge, J. (2011): 'The Post-Tragedy 'Opportunity-bubble' and the Prospect of Citizen Engagement', *Homeland Security Affairs*, <https://www.hsaj.org/articles/61>

⁷ Hegemann, H. and Kahl, M. (2015): 'Constructions of Effectiveness and the Rationalization of Counterterrorism Policy: The Case of Biometric Passports', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 38:3: 199-218

tackling this online material, owing to the sheer volume of it and the diversity of its type and the type of online platform which is currently hosting it. While removing extreme content remains a priority for law enforcement agencies, one particular author⁸ presents a far reaching strategy for dealing with online radicalisation by tackling not the supply, but the demand. In order to do this, Neumann⁹ suggests that the government can act as a mediator, facilitating online spaces in which open debate is possible, connecting with experts who can support positive online debate, disseminating counter-narratives and engaging extremists in dialogue. Education is, according to Neumann¹⁰, crucial, providing young people with information about how the internet can be used by radical groups, the strategies they use and ways to think critically about them. In the shorter term, he points out that online radical forums can be of great interest to law enforcement and intelligence agencies as an unparalleled source of information on the activities of radical groups. In this sense collaboration with information technology companies is recommended.

Policy advice:

- Be aware of the importance of the internet for radicalisation – that it can be used to spread extremist material, to recruit and to mobilise terrorist groups.
- Both long and short-term measures need to be taken to tackle online radicalisation. Short-term measures can include using extremist sites to monitor terrorist activity. Longer-term activities can include incorporating education on online extremism into standard school curricula, and promoting online fora where open debate can take place.
- Laws and regulations on the use of online space need to be clarified so that the rules for what is and is not allowed online are clear and readily available.
- Governments should form partnerships with technology companies and with non-governmental actors so that, through collaboration, effective counter-narratives and the potential for positive online debate can be fully utilized.

Lone wolves

In a theme directly related to extremist online content, trends in recent literature reflect that the phenomenon of the lone wolf terrorist – someone acting in the name of a group but without practical support from it – has been receiving increasing attention within European literature and is seen as a growing European problem. Non-violent groups which use a warlike rhetoric can, even without an explicit call to arms, sometimes inspire individuals to violent actions. While no breakthroughs of understanding on lone wolf terrorism can be claimed in recent years, one important point does stand out from recent literature – that unlike most people who become involved with a radical group, who do not necessarily have a history of mental illness, a significant group of lone wolves do.

⁸ Neumann, Peter R. (2013): 'Options and Strategies for Countering Online Radicalization in the United States', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism*, 36(6): 431-459

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

Policy advice on this subject:

- The threat of lone wolf terrorism appears to be rising and counter-terrorism policy and professionals should be aware of this trend and how potential lone wolves may be recognised.
- An important factor in this recognition process is awareness that some lone wolves have had a history of mental illness. This might prompt deliberation on whether to take policy measures to support collaboration between mental health services and law enforcement agencies.
- Because of the manner in which lone wolves tend to radicalise (largely online), they can leave considerable digital footprints in terms of searches for radical groups, equipment, etc. This can leave them vulnerable to the efforts of intelligence and police agencies who should be extra alert to this threat.

Rehabilitation, Reintegration and Deradicalisation

Following a terrorist attack and alongside a general public, European governments also find themselves faced with groups of victims – those who have been directly impacted by the event and who have suffered physical damage or loss. We recommend referring to the Handbook produced by the RAN (Radicalisation Awareness Network) on this subject as a comprehensive guide on how to deal with victims of terrorism.

European governments should have legislation and mechanisms in place to assist and support victims of future terrorist attacks. These must be tailor made to suit the cultural context and the circumstances of the victims, and should include mechanisms through which the victims themselves can be consulted as to their needs.

The incarceration of those convicted of terror related offenses

Another crucial aspect of the after-the-fact approach is, of course, what to do with those who have been convicted of terrorist offences. Some recent literature highlights the fact that prisons can in themselves be place which those holding radical views use to recruit more people to their cause, while the Quest for Significance Model described by Kruglanski et al¹¹ also makes some points which are highly relevant to the incarceration phase.

Owing to the fact that those who hold deeply entrenched radical views may use the prison setting to recruit others, clear recommendations emerge from recent literature in order to prevent this: essentially, managing their incarceration in a way which ensures that their contact with general prison populations is minimal. This both prevents them using the prison context for recruitment purposes, and that the potential deradicalisation process of other convicts is hindered by re-exposure to extreme narratives and views.

¹¹ Dugas, M. and Kruglanski, A. (2014): ‘The Quest for Significance Model of Radilcalization’

The significance quest model describes how the drive to radicalise can be caused by a desire to matter. This idea becomes particularly relevant in the context of a prison sentence, whose goal, of course, is to contribute to the deradicalisation process and to ready the prisoner as far as possible for successful reintegration into civil society. Rehabilitation programmes which are focused on the individual – drawing the psychological focus away from the group identity and the pull of the radical group – and which build upon individual skills which can be seen as an investment in a positive future (such as vocational training) have been shown to be effective.

Policy advice:

- The logistics of the incarceration of those who have been convicted of terrorist offences is an important point.
- It is unwise to imprison those who are deeply committed on a long term basis to the terrorist cause alongside those who are for example offending for a first time. This may inhibit the capacity of newer offenders to leave the extreme group behind when exposed to deradicalisation programmes and even provide some offenders with the opportunity to use the prison setting for recruitment purposes.
- Elements which help prisoners focus upon their own individual perspective, drawing attention away from the group perspective (e.g.: yoga and meditation) can be helpful components of deradicalisation programmes.
- Similarly, elements which focus upon helping an individual to build up a positive image of his or her future through providing a broad range of occupational training also help to contribute to an image of the future in which prisoners can find a sense of significance away from the extreme group.
- Ensuring that prisoners are treated in a respectful way avoids humiliation. This is vital in that humiliation can once again detract from a sense of personal significance, thereby undermining the message of the deradicalisation programme.

The above points provide a brief overview of the key findings from within the most recent literature published on the subject of extremism and radicalisation. The following chapters explore some practical examples of good practices and policies from various European locations, identified during the course of our research.

TERRA's Site Visits

Exit and Hayat

Exit and Hayat are counter-extremism programmes that are based in Berlin and implemented by ZDK (Gesellschaft Demokratische Kultur). Although both share the aim of deradicalising and reintegrating individuals who have been in contact with radical groups, the two programmes take different approaches: Exit works directly with members of the extreme right wing, while Hayat provides support to families who are concerned that their children may be becoming involved with Islamist extremist groups. Both are financed at least in part by the Federal Ministry for Family Affairs, Senior Citizens, Women and Youth, a ministry of the central German government. The full site visit report on Exit and Hayat can be downloaded from the TERRA website – what follows is a summary of the most salient points from within it.

Exit

Exit Germany was founded in 2000 by criminologist and former police detective Bernd Wagner and former neo-Nazi leader Ingo Hasselbach. Their focus is on deradicalising those who have been involved in the German extreme right wing movement, and while they are prepared to help anyone from that background who approaches them for assistance, they focus mainly upon the upper echelons of the group, including groups leaders, party leaders and those who are actively involved in violence. Since its initiation in 2000, Exit Germany has handled over 500 cases, and boasts a recidivism rate of only 3%.¹²

Background, Strategy and Structure

Exit's main activities are twofold. Firstly, it publicises its own existence, the services it offers to those who would like to leave extreme right wing movements behind, and the counter-narrative to the extreme right wing message. It aims to do these things in a way which requires a minimum of financial input while achieving a maximum degree of publicity. One example of this work is the 'Trojan T-shirt' campaign, in which a free T-shirt was provided to people attending a right wing rock festival, Rock Für Deutschland. On first glance, these T-shirts appeared to bear a logo consistent with the right wing ideology, but once the T-shirts were washed, the logo washed out, revealing instead the words 'If your T-shirt can do it, so can you,' along with the logo and contact details of Exit Germany.¹³ This coup brought a lot of publicity to Exit, and the amount of people consulting them to leave the extreme right tripled.¹⁴

¹² From Exit's English language website: <http://www.exit-deutschland.de/english/>.

¹³ A Youtube film is available on this project: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CS1bsHKEP-8>.

¹⁴ Details of this and other similar campaigns can be found on Exit's website.

Secondly, it works directly with those who contact them, requesting assistance with their exit from the extreme right scene. Exit Germany's website¹⁵ makes it very clear what precisely Exit can offer to those contacting them for support. These services are:

- a. Psychosocial support/ counselling. This is focussed upon providing new perspectives on the extreme right movement, and exploring an 'alternative world view and outlook on life". This critical reflection is, Exit Germany states, a crucial part of the dropout process, undermining the very core of the radical ideology. The help provided by Exit is dependent upon the clients cutting all ties with the group and its ideology.
- b. Support with the physical risks of leaving an extreme right wing organisation, including, where necessary, moving house, sometimes internationally, a change of identity, and/or receiving police protection.
- c. Support in finding other services which may be necessary to the process, for example, psychologists or employers.
- d. No financial support is provided to those leaving the groups.
- e. No protection from judicial procedure is provided in the event that the individual has been involved in criminal actions.

Aside from the high impact but low budget publicity activities such as the Trojan T-shirt, described above, Exit does not seek to contact its target group. This 'passive" approach is crucial to Exit's work, because it means that those who do contact them do so from their own volition. This willingness to be open to Exit's message is seen as prerequisite to a successful exit process. In a very few cases, cooperation with Exit is a condition of parole following a prison sentence for criminality connected to the extreme right movement. These cases are only successful if the person in question is ready to leave the extreme right movement.

Monitoring Extremist Activity

A vital part of the work of Exit employees is to stay up to date with the landscape of the far right scene, so that when they are approached, they can offer expert guidance to those who contact them. This work includes for example monitoring internet sites, tracking geographical movements of members of the extreme right wing, and monitoring behaviour at demonstrations. Most of Exit's work is with the leadership levels of extreme right wing groups, ranging in age from 25 to 60.

Making Contact

First contact usually takes the form of a phone call. Following an initial call, employees from Exit will meet the client, sometimes at the Exit office, sometimes at the client's home, and sometimes on neutral territory such as at a café.

¹⁵ Exit's English language website, <http://www.exit-deutschland.de/english/>.

The state of mind of the client at the initial point of contact can vary widely. In some cases, contact is sought when the first doubts about the validity of the extreme right wing organisation sets in. In others, years have passed since the exit process has been completed, and the individual is struggling with the consequences of once having been involved in the movement. These two extremes, and every stage in between, is reflected in the case load of Exit at any given time.

The structure of Exit's work at this initial stage follows a set pattern. First, a security analysis is made to ascertain whether the individual is at risk. An approach is formulated according to the needs of the individual in question. The Exit counsellors discuss what the needs are, and what the client would like to achieve. The boundaries of Exit's work are clearly set forth – no money is available; sometimes the contact ends as soon as thin information is given.

Counselling and Practical Support

The daily work of Exit practitioners consists of counselling the client and, where necessary, offering practical support. This last can range from advice on how to manage and orchestrate the actual exit, to supporting a change of identity and even an international move, if the security situation of the individual in question renders this necessary. In some cases, there are no security concerns, and the client is simply seeking a partner for discussion.

Following an exit, the client can face a very challenging time. Their entire social network, sometimes including employment situation and sometimes even family ties and/or relationship with a spouse, have disintegrated and they are often entirely isolated. Just as drug and alcohol addiction can play a significant role in the pre-radicalisation phase of some individuals who later joins the extreme right wing movement, following their disengagement the dangers of addiction can also threaten the wellbeing of a client. At this point, the reliable presence of a counsellor, available at all times, can provide a much needed support for the client. In some cases, re-establishing links with family members who were left behind during the radicalisation process can be an important characteristic of this period, and a counsellor can provide support with, amongst other things, this aspect. They can also provide links to potential employers and if necessary, specialised psychological support.

Keys to Success

Exit attributes their impressively small recidivism rate to their approach to the ideology and narrative of the right wing movement. The services of Exit are on offer only under strict conditions – that the client cuts off all ties with the extreme right wing group. Once a relationship of trust is established with the client, the extreme right wing ideology is discussed in detail, and questioned. A more plural, questioning worldview is fostered. Average contacts last two to four years, but Exit cases are never considered to be closed – contact with a client can range between extremely intense, including multiple contacts per week, to years going by without contact.

Hayat

Hayat was established in 2011 on the basis of the expertise already gathered from ZDK's work with radicals from the extreme right wing. It is at its core a family support programme, supporting families – often mothers – who are concerned that a child or other family member is becoming involved in Islamist extremism. Hayat offers them free, confidential counselling and support, often directed towards preventing the person in question from travelling out to participate as a combatant in non-European conflict zones. The contact is entirely confidential, unless Hayat learn of a planned terror attack or travel to or from Syria, in which case the authorities will have to be notified, with the consent of the families. In some cases, Hayat encourages and supports families in making this contact with authorities themselves.

Background, Strategy and Structure

Hayat's personnel engage in three main activities. They publicise their activities in a less spectacular manner than Exit, but nonetheless in a way in which it comes under the attention of its target group – giving interviews in popular women's magazines, for example. Secondly, Hayat delivers training and information to public bodies, for example to schools and the police. Thirdly, it delivers support directly to its target group.

Following the same model used by Exit, Hayat publicises its services but does not approach individuals, instead waiting to be approached by its target groups. Once a contact is made, an initial risk assessment is made, with the first and most pressing question being whether the case shows a tendency towards radicalisation, or whether it is simply a harmless conversion to Islam.

Hayat's flyer lists its services as being the following:

- a. Counselling, providing contacts and listening
- b. Differentiating between a 'strong, lived faith' and a sense of inequality which can lead to extremism and terrorism
- c. Assisting in identifying warning signs and providing practical support
- d. Providing new perspectives and giving support for as long as is necessary.

For parents who are worried that their child may be considering travelling to Syria, or whose child has returned from Syria, they follow three main goals:

- a. Try everything possible to make them voluntarily refrain from travelling abroad
- b. If they are already abroad: try to stop them from active combat and make them return
- c. Assist persons to return and integrate into a safe social environment that respects universal human rights.

Although Hayat's daily work is based upon supporting families who are concerned about one of their members, its work has a vital security element, using the family bond as a powerful magnet to draw vulnerable individuals away from the radical groups.

Making Contact

A first contact is usually made by phone. The Hayat counsellor makes an initial assessment of the situation. Many of their cases are cases of conversion to Islam, which in some families who perhaps practice a different religion, can be met with misunderstanding and alarm. In these cases, information about Islam and some reassurance and counselling is given, in order to support the good functioning of the family. In other cases, however, more worrying developments have taken place, in which either a previously Muslim family member has become increasingly devout and confers with a new, radical group, or a convert has become involved with a group which extremist ideas. In either case, these developments place a strain on family ties, and deliver a point at which Hayat can offer assistance.

Counselling and Practical Support

On-going contact with the client is usually conducted by telephone. As with Exit, the intensity of this contact can vary very widely, and can range dramatically in content. An assumption is made by Hayat practitioners that security, acceptance and belonging are the three main psychological commodities on offer from the radical groups. In supporting the family and strengthening family ties, it is hoped that these commodities can be offered by the family in place of the radical group, and that the vulnerable person will no longer feel the need to seek them from external sources. This assumption forms one of the three pillars on which the contact work of Hayat is based. Secondly, Hayat offers advice and support to parents on practical issues, such as helping returnees from foreign combat to find a stable environment upon return, for example regarding their studies or employment. Thirdly, the ideological aspect of radicalisation is also tackled, through trying to support cognitive change in the radicalised individual, for example, through contact with the family. This may include providing counter-narratives, or helping to foster a positive view of the social context as well as biographical work.

Contact with family members often takes place in secret – that is, the person about whom concern has been raised is not aware that the parent, sibling or spouse is in contact with Hayat, as this may endanger the counselling process. The core of the work is in helping the client – often a parent – to understand what the attraction of the radical group is. In order to achieve this, a lot of information is given – information about Islam, but also about what the child may be seeking through their contact with the group. Guilt is often a key factor in a parent's response to their child joining a radical group, and counselling can help to build up a solid basis within the family to work on.

Lately, Hayat has started working with a family therapy group, so that serious underlying problems – mental health problems within the family, for example – can be tackled by specialised professionals.

The goal in each Hayat case is different. In some cases, the target is to stop someone from travelling to a foreign conflict. In others, the family member may already be in, for example, Syria, and the aim then shifts to trying to persuade them not to take part in combat, while in others the vulnerable person may be almost at the point of breaking off ties with their family, and the goal of the counselling is to preserve that bond.

Keys to Success

In providing this service, Hayat supports managing a potentially dangerous situation with minimal resources, and in a way which supports the psychosocial wellbeing of its target group. Hayat thereby provides a very valuable resource for both the government and the populace.

Exit at a Glance

Exit is a deradicalisation programme in Berlin and has been operating since 2000. It works with those who wish to leave the extreme right wing movement, especially those at leadership level.

Exit's goals are:

- To provide counter narrative to the extreme right wing message
- To provide practical and psychological support to those leaving the radical group

Exit offers:

- Psychological support and counselling
- Support with the security aspect of leaving a violent group, including arranging police protection, a change of identity, or moving house.
- Support with setting up a future, including contact with potential employers or psychologists

Exit's principles are:

- Voluntary participation
- Entering into ideological discussion about the fundamental beliefs of the right wing group.
- Individual guidance and advice

Hayat at a Glance

Hayat is a family support programme in Berlin, Germany and has been operating since 2011. It works with families who are concerned that a family member is involved in Islamist extremism.

Hayat's goals are:

- To provide advice and support to families who are worried about a family member
- To foster strong family ties so that the pull of the radical group will be lessened

Hayat offers:

- Psychological support and counselling
- Practical support, for example negotiating with a school or employer to foster better circumstances for the vulnerable individual

Hayat's principles are:

- Healthy family relationships can prevent and tackle radicalisation at its root

Blueprint of the Hayat and Exit Programmes

If we try to derive a blueprint for Exit and Hayat, which can be used to inform policy makers from other European countries, there are some key elements which need to be taken into account. These are:

- **Providing one-to-one counselling.** Although the specific goals of this contact differs from case to case, the ultimate goal remains the same – to create a context where a future can be built up on a positive basis, negating the pull of the radical group.
- **Emphasising the role of families.** Both Hayat and Exit recognise the important role that families can play in the fight against extremism.
- **Focusing on narrative.** Both intervention programmes have emphasised the role that narrative plays in the radicalisation process. They have been successful in undermining extremist narratives by using former radicals, psychological support and humour and by providing alternative narratives.
- **Targeting the entire spectrum.** Hayat and Exit have targeted both Islamist and far-right extremism, which has contributed both to their effectiveness (to undermine both sides' narratives) and to their positive public perception.
- **Using innovative communication tools.** The programmes' use of innovative low-budget campaigns has helped them to spread their message, to raise awareness and to increase their popularity among civil society.
- **Using the grassroots.** Grass root agencies like Hayat and Exit offer not only very valuable psychosocial support, they also reduce the threat to security, and do so in a way which only needs a minimal intervention from security or law enforcement agencies. In this sense they also need only a minimal financial input from government or other sources in return for a highly valuable service. Some cooperation with law enforcement agencies is also necessary. There should be complete transparency from the agency to their clients about this interaction.

Both Exit and Hayat are highly adaptable to the specific contexts of different cases and are therefore transferable to other countries, other cultural, political and demographic circumstances and other forms of extremism.

The Aarhus Model

The Aarhus model is a Danish counter-extremism initiative which was introduced by the City of Aarhus and the East Jutland Police in 2007. Its aim is to provide early prevention of radicalisation and violent extremism of vulnerable people in the Aarhus area and to provide individual guidance and reintegration support to returning fighters.

Background, Strategy and Structure

The Aarhus model is the result of a close collaboration between East Jutland Police, the department of Social Affairs and Employment and the department of Children and Youths of the City of Aarhus. Among its partnering institutions are Aarhus University, the Prison and Probation Service, the Clinic for PTSD and Transcultural Psychiatry and the Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET).

The initiative was launched in 2007 in response to the 7/7 bombings of 2005 in London. Its initial aim was therefore limited to preventing home-grown terrorism by identifying young people who are on the path to radicalisation. New challenges posed by ISIL propaganda and recruitment activities in Denmark have, however, led to a more specialised, nuanced approach in this area. In mid-2013 Aarhus therefore started developing contingency plans for dealing with travellers to Syria.

Denmark's approach to targeted prevention and deradicalisation is unique in Europe. While most European countries have introduced tough new anti-terror legislations to crack down on jihadists returning from Syria, travelling to Syria and returning from Syria is not illegal in Denmark. As Denmark's second largest city, Aarhus has hosted international jihadists and has experienced waves of radicalisation in the past. According to ICSR 2015's Report, Denmark has produced the second highest number of jihadists per capita in Europe after Belgium: by early 2015, 27 per 1 million Danish citizen had joined ISIL's fight in Iraq and Syria.

This has created a need to strengthen integration measures, enhance counter-extremism initiatives and create effective deradicalisation programmes.

Infopoint Hotline

The Infohouse is at the heart of the Aarhus Model. It is a unit which provides support and information to parents, teachers and other people who are in contact with young and/or vulnerable individuals. When parents or frontline workers suspect an individual of being at risk of radicalisation and/or fighting abroad, they can contact the Infopoint hotline. The hotline employs trained staff and offers guidance and counselling for parents and frontline workers on how to communicate with at-risk individuals and on how to influence fighters to return home.

Workshops for Parents

As parents are often in the best position to notice and react to the signs of radicalisation, Aarhus offers dialogue-based workshops about extremism and radicalisation processes which can complement parent-teacher meetings at the child's school. They can also be organised as a special event at the child's association or sports club. These workshops are

informative and educative but they also provide a platform for parents to exchange ideas and to express and assess their concerns. The workshops also address the dilemma of the parents' role and responsibility in regards to their exercise of control over their children's community involvement, their expression of views and their use of the Internet. Furthermore, parents receive information about possible prevention measures and contact points.

In addition to these workshops, Aarhus has developed a network for parents of young people who are involved in extremist circles. The network organises meetings which take place once a month. The purpose of this initiative is to encourage them to share experiences with other parents who find themselves in similar situations. The network can help parents to receive advice on how to deal with certain situations and challenges.

Workshops for Professionals

In order to raise awareness, Aarhus organises introductory presentations on anti-radicalisation strategies for professionals. This is either delivered in the form of a forty-five minutes presentation or as a more dialogue-based presentation lasting one and a half hours.

Furthermore, the Infohouse offers a range of local dialogue-based and participatory workshops to educate professionals on the signs of radicalisation. In these workshops, frontline workers receive tools to notice and react to behavioural changes and warning signs. The workshops also emphasise the dilemma of the professional's role and responsibility in regards to their exercise of control over young people's community involvement, their expression of views and their use of the Internet. Furthermore, professionals receive information about possible prevention measures and contact points.

Workshops for Young People

Aarhus also facilitates dialogue-based workshops for pupils in secondary schools and youth education programmes. In 2012, Aarhus has started to promote its relations and dialogue with pupils in their final year of school and higher education programmes to assist them in bypassing extremist circles.

Workshops can be organised either by instructors who are involved in Aarhus work on 'Preventing radicalization and discrimination' or by teachers. In the first case, the class's permanent teachers stay in the workshop so that they can later integrate input and ideas from the workshop into their classes. In the latter case, Aarhus only acts as a facilitator by providing teachers with information and explanations regarding the workshop model. Once teachers have expressed interest in holding a workshop, Aarhus sends them a package of materials, which includes a workshop manual as well as materials and ideas for the preparation of the workshop.

Workshops at schools seek to provide knowledge on topics related to radicalisation, extremism, discrimination and prejudice but they also leave enough space for students to express their opinions and to share their reflections.

Mentor Support

Since 2010, Aarhus has offered a mentoring programme with the aim of intervening early in an individual's radicalisation processes. This preventive mentor support programme aims at addressing individuals at any stage of the radicalisation process: It targets returning fighters

as well as non-violent radicalised individuals and young individuals at-risk of radicalisation and/or joining political or religious extremist movements.

As 'Mentor Support' acts in accordance with the Danish legislation on social services, all work is officially registered and given a case number with social services. Furthermore, a mentor can only be assigned through a formal decision by a social worker linked to the Aarhus working group on the prevention of radicalisation and extremism of young people and adults.

Exit Programme

The Exit programme was designed to help radicalised adults leave their extremist political or religious network and to facilitate their return to the community. The programme is flexible and can be adapted to the individual needs and circumstances of its participants. Its support can range from advice, guidance, and psychological counselling to concrete reintegration support such as help with finding educational programme and/or work. The Exist programme requires that the individual 'is deemed to be sincerely motivated' and it usually necessitates the participant's consent for the information exchange between authorities. The Mentor Support programme is a mandatory part of the Exit programme.

The effectiveness of the Aarhus model is proven by an actual decrease in the number of foreign fighters over the past years. Its methodology is well worked out, which makes it transferable to other contexts.

Aarhus at a Glance:

Aarhus is an innovative counter-extremism initiative started in 2007 by the City of Aarhus and the East Jutland Police.

Aarhus' goals are:

- to help prevent the radicalisation of young people
- to support the rehabilitation and reintegration of returning fighters

The Aarhus Infohouse offers:

- an infopoint hotline for parents and frontline workers
- workshops for parents, professionals and young people
- mentor support for young people at risk-of radicalisation
- an exit programme for returning fighters and radicalised adults

Aarhus' principles are:

- dialogue with minority communities and vulnerable individuals
- voluntariness of the participants
- individual guidance and advice

Blueprint of the Aarhus Model

If we try to derive a blueprint for the Aarhus model, which can be used to inform policy makers from other European countries, there are some key elements that need to be taken into account. These are:

- **Taking a multi-agency approach.** The Aarhus model is based on a close partnership between police and the local authorities, including different departments who collaborate closely to counter extremism. Clearly defined structures have minimised silo problems and trans-agency communication obstacles.
- **Empowering and educating civil society.** A strong element of the Aarhus model is the strategy to offer workshops at schools, raising awareness and creating knowledge about controversial issues. It empowers and educates both vulnerable individuals and frontline workers.
- **Combining targeted prevention, deradicalisation and rehabilitation.** Aarhus combines prevention and awareness raising initiatives with exit, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes. Programmes are adapted to the radicalisation stage and specific needs of a vulnerable individual; returning fighters are accompanied during the entire deradicalisation and reintegration process.
- **Building relationships of trust.** The guiding principles of the Aarhus model are dialogue, guidance and mentoring. All programmes rely on trusted relations with communities and voluntary participation. Its programmes are carried out in a well-defined and transparent structure of a self-sustaining system. This has led to a positive public perception of the model.

To be effectively implemented in other countries the Aarhus model would need to be adapted to existing local structures.

The Prevent Strategy

Exit, Hayat and the Aarhus model all focus on delivering individual help to those who are vulnerable to or have been part of, radical groups. The next good practice which study will describe is a national policy focussing on targeted prevention.

Background, Strategy and Structure

The Prevent strategy, launched by the UK government in 2007 in response to the 7/7 bombings, takes an approach that looks beyond traditional legal tools applied in counter-terrorism. It focuses on the pre-criminal space by promoting civil society action, countering extremist ideologies and narratives, developing and disseminating counter-narratives and addressing identity crises and grievances perceived by those vulnerable to or in the process of radicalisation.

In 2011, the Prevent strategy was defined as having three specific strategic objectives¹⁶:

- a. to tackle the ideological roots of terrorism and address the threats posed by those who promote it
- b. to prevent people from becoming involved in terrorism and ensure that they receive support at an early stage in the radicalisation process; and
- c. to partner with sectors and public institutions that face high risks of radicalisation.

In the course of its various amendments, most notably in 2011¹⁷ and 2013¹⁸, Prevent has developed a stronger focus on the ideological dimension of terrorism and extremism. As non-violent extremist ideologies were increasingly recognised as a gateway to terrorism¹⁹, challenging these ideologies and supporting counter-extremism networks has become a key priority of Prevent in recent years. Recent amendments have also promoted the integration of the strategy into a wide range of sectors such as education, criminal justice, faith, charities, the Internet and health. In 2015, the government has furthermore focused its efforts on communications capacity building with civil society groups to counter extremist propaganda.²⁰ The Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill 2015 has reaffirmed the Prevent

¹⁶ HM Government (2011): 'Prevent Strategy', Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, June 2011, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-review.pdf

¹⁷ HM Government (2011): 'Prevent Strategy'

¹⁸ HM Government (2013): 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism – Annual Report', Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department, March 2013, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/170644/28307_Cm_8583_v0_20.pdf

¹⁹ HM Government (2011): 'Prevent Strategy'

²⁰ HM Government (2016): 'CONTEST: The United Kingdom's Strategy for Countering Terrorism: Annual Report for 2015', Presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for the Home Department https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/539684/55469_Cm_9310_P RINT_v0.11.pdf

strategy by rendering it a statutory duty for local authorities and frontline workers in police offices, schools, prisons and other public institutions.²¹

The local-level Prevent work includes the monitoring of extremist activities, the provision of guidance and funding to partners and the support of vulnerable individuals. Accordingly, Prevent leads engage in multiple main areas: they conduct outreach work and raise awareness in local institutions. This often includes training teachers and other frontline workers and providing them with resources and materials that they can use in their work with young people and other vulnerable groups. They also offer support packages to individuals at risk of radicalisation, most notably through the Channel programme. Moreover, they deter extremists from spreading their ideology in the local area by denying them public platforms.²² They work closely with the Police to safeguard vulnerable individuals and to react to warning signs of radicalisation. Finally they also teach critical thinking skills and encourage community-led alternative narrative campaigns.

Community Resilience Projects

In order to implement this work at community level, Prevent works through designated community resilience project officers. Apart from working with frontline practitioners, community resilience project officers also have a responsibility in detecting and disrupting extremism. They keep an eye on the politics of their borough: for example, they watch who is leafleting about extremism and talking to schools, so that they can warn the head teachers and raise awareness about these groups. Prevent officers also seek to encourage initiatives that aim at teaching critical thinking skills, exposing the communications and recruiting strategies of extremist organisations and countering the narratives and conspiracy theories that are used to lure vulnerable individuals into extremism.

Training of Frontline Workers

The Home Office has developed a core training product to equip teachers and other frontline workers to identify children at risk of being drawn into terrorism. There are a rising number of accredited WRAP (Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent) trained facilitators in safeguarding roles within local councils, the police, health institutions and higher education. Schools usually have a Designated Safeguarding Lead who is in charge of ensuring that Prevent awareness training and advice on the topic of radicalisation are provided to all staff members.²³

²¹ HM Government (2015): 'Revised Prevent Duty Guidance: For England and Wales', July 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/445977/3799_Revised_Prevent_Duty_Guidance__England_Wales_V2-Interactive.pdf, accessed 5 March 2016

²² Ghaffar Hussain (2015): 'Countering Extremism: Learning from the United Kingdom Model', Occasional Paper, Programme on Extremism

²³ HM Government (2015): 'The Prevent Duty: Departmental advice for schools and childcare providers', June 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/439598/prevent-duty-departmental-advice-v6.pdf

The Channel Referral Programme

The Channel referral programme is a substantial part of the Prevent Strategy. It is a multi-agency panel that uses a referral process designed to identify and support individuals who are deemed at-risk of radicalisation. Pilot projects of Channel started in 2007 before the programme was formally launched across England and Wales in 2012. Since its introduction, some 4,000 individuals have been referred to Channel. The theoretical background of the policy is that it is both possible and necessary to intervene before an individual is radicalised.²⁴

Channel has therefore created the necessary framework to deliver early intervention. In a first step, individuals who have expressed extremist ideologies or are suspected of being at risk of radicalisation are referred to the Channel panel. According to the Channel Duty Guidance²⁵, the panel's role is then to:

- a. identify individuals at risk;
- b. assess the nature and extent of that risk; and
- c. develop the most appropriate support plan for the individuals concerned.

All referred cases are therefore assessed by Channel agents to determine an individual's risk level and a suitable risk-reduction programme. In 2010, the Home Office and the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) identified four key factors that can be used to assess the risk level of an individual²⁶:

- a. exposure to ideologies and narratives that legitimise or require violent action
- b. access to people or groups that directly and persuasively propagate these ideologies and narratives and relate them to an individual's grievances
- c. a crisis of identity, often triggered by personal grievances
- d. perceived socio-political grievances, to which there may seem to be no credible and effective non-violent response.

Channel is a flexible programme that can be adapted to the different needs of at-risk individuals. The concrete activities that are included in an individual's support package depend on risk vulnerability and availability of local resources. In high-risk cases, support is often provided through one-to-one mentoring programmes. The time of the respective programme can, however, vary between a few weeks and several months, depending on the achieved results. During the time of the intervention, cases are monitored and evaluated by Channel agents.

²⁴ Rashad Ali (2015): 'De-radicalization and Integration: The United Kingdom's Channel Programme', Occasional Paper, Programme on Extremism, October 2015

²⁵ HM Government (2015): Channel Duty Guidance: protecting vulnerable people from being drawn into terrorism', Statutory guidance for Channel panel members and partners of local panel

²⁶ HM Government (2010): 'Channel: Supporting individuals vulnerable to recruitment by violent extremists: A guide for focal partnerships'

Prevent at a Glance:

Prevent is one of the four elements of the UK government's counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, which was launched in 2007 by the Home Office.

Prevent's goals are:

- to deter individuals from becoming involved in violent extremism
- to tackle the ideological roots of terrorism and address the threats posed by those who promote it
- to partner with sectors and public institutions with high risk of radicalisation

Prevent's measures include:

- empowerment of grassroots movements and community engagement
- early intervention in the radicalisation process through Channel
- 'Prevent duty' for local policy makers and frontline workers

Prevent's principles are:

- risk-based support of local governments
- cooperation and dialogue with public institutions
- fighting the roots of terrorism through early intervention

Blueprint of the Prevent Strategy

If we try to derive a blueprint for the Prevent Strategy, which can be used to inform policy makers from other European countries, there are some key elements that need to be taken into account. These are:

- **Taking a comprehensive approach.** Prevent takes a full-spectrum approach to tackling extremism of all forms. It uses a combination of community engagement, counter-speech and early intervention methods to provide primary prevention, targeted prevention and deradicalisation.
- **Partnering with public institutions.** Prevent's strong emphasis of the role of public institutions has allowed for faster identification of vulnerable individuals and early intervention in radicalisation processes. In particular, teachers, prison guards and mental health workers have been identified as key partners.
- **Encouraging multi-agency collaboration.** The Prevent Strategy is based on a multi-agency approach, which has allowed for collaboration between the national government, the police, local authorities and public institutions.
- **Using inter-disciplinary expertise.** Prevent's policy framework is based on research and evidence from multiple disciplines and has effectively translated academic findings into policies. It also uses inter-disciplinary panels for its Channel referral system to determine the vulnerability of referred individuals.
- **Teaching critical thinking.** Critical thinking as part of the education system is very important to enhance as a method to prevent radicalisation and stimulate resilience. It influences the formation of identities: it can lead to social cohesion and foster a better understanding of universal humanity.
- **Staying flexible.** The strategy has benefitted from a high degree of flexibility and an ability to swiftly adapt to different contexts and changes in the threat landscape.

To be effectively implemented in other countries and contexts Prevent needs to be adapted to local structures and cultural peculiarities.

The Dutch Integration Policy

The last good practice that we analysed is an integration policy operating at the national level, this time in the Netherlands. In contrast to the other good practices (i.e. Exit/Hayat, the Aarhus model and Prevent) the broad Dutch integration policy is not directly related to radicalisation. However, integration policy can be relevant for creating a social context that does not provide a breeding ground for polarisation and possible radicalisation.²⁷ Positive integration leads to a cohesive society, which is by its very nature resilient to the message of radical groups.

Background, Strategy and Structure

The Dutch government takes a unique perspective on immigration and integration²⁸: It is explicit in its statement of pride in Dutch citizens with immigrant backgrounds who contribute to society. Integration starts with the choice to live in the Netherlands. Accordingly, immigrants are expected to internalise a fundament of shared core values, basic principles, rights and duties of Dutch society upon their arrival in the country - societal participation, education, employment and acquisition of the Dutch language are crucial aspects for this. Additionally, to support immigrants, established Dutch citizens are encouraged to create opportunities for migrant groups and to actively interact with them to prevent parallelism and facilitate their integration.

Being a Dutch citizen also means living according to the boundaries of the democratic state. Within these boundaries, all Dutch citizens share equal rights and are free to live according to their own cultural and religious insights. Everyone receives equal opportunities to evolve, to become successful, to participate and to be self-reliant. Hence, the Dutch education system supports the motivation and optimism of young people to play an active role in the Dutch society and increases their knowledge of boundaries.

To support positive integration, the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment (i.e. Ministry SAE) launched its Agenda Integration in 2013²⁹ that revolves around three pillars: (a) promoting participation and self-reliance, (b) setting boundaries and improving education, and (c) encouraging interactions with others and internalisation of values.³⁰ The focus points of these integration pillars which are the most relevant for TERRA and therefore briefly described below, are implemented through various programmes. These focus points support the overall governmental views on integration. The official and complete focus points can be found in the Dutch governmental documents about the Agenda Integration.

The Ministry SEA additionally makes use of knowledge and research that support (the evidence-base of the) integration policies. This research addresses the evolving questions

²⁷ The Netherlands (2015): Letter of the Ministry SAE: Progress Agenda Integration, p.3

²⁸ The Netherlands (2013): Letter of the Ministry SAE: Agenda Integration, pp.1-6

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ The Netherlands (2015): Ministry SAE: Overview of the Progress Agenda Integration

which surround the issue of integration, such as at what point someone can be considered to be successfully integrated. Shifts in what it means to integrate should be continuously discussed, as one knowledge institute emphasised in its research.³¹ Promoting and supporting this ongoing discussion is an important aspect of ensuring that the approach of the Dutch government remains fully up to date and that its integration strategies avoid estrangement from society, a phenomenon with many end stations, one of which may be radicalisation.³²

Integration pillar 1: Promoting Participation and Self-reliance

The first pillar of the Dutch integration policy aims at optimising the active participation of immigrants in society. Immigrants need to meet certain practical criteria before they can actively participate in society:

- a.) Every new migrant, who is not from the EEA (European Economic Area), Switzerland or Turkey and who wants to live in the Netherlands for an extended period is required to complete an integration course.³³ Societal goals of this course are the improvement of participation, self-reliance and functioning in working environments. High importance is ascribed to immigrants' proficiency in the Dutch language.
- b.) EU immigrants, who do not have to complete the integration course, are offered information on subjects relevant to their integration processes, for example, the rights of EU-immigrants, duties and fundamental core values, and how they can prevent negative situations, such as exploitation.

All arriving immigrants are asked to sign a participation statement, which informs them about their rights, duties and fundamental core values in the Netherlands. This supports their awareness of their own expectations and those of the society.

To support immigrants in the employment market and to mitigate discrimination and high unemployment rates among immigrants, the government invests a great deal in preventing unemployment amongst (young) immigrants. Furthermore, Dutch authorities have improved links between immigrants, the society and societal support institutions (i.e. mental health care).

Integration pillar 2: Setting Boundaries and Improving Education

The aim of the policy's second pillar is to improve education and generate clarity for those who violate core values of the society by setting boundaries. Youth criminality among Dutch

³¹ Knowledge platform Integration & Society (in Dutch Kennisplatform Integratie & Samenleving) (2016): Year report 2015, 'The contentious refugee' (in Dutch 'De omstreden vluchteling'), Webpage: <http://www.kis.nl/sites/default/files/bestanden/Publicaties/kis-jaarbericht-2015-web.pdf>

³² TERRA, 'Site visit: Interview Knowledge platform Integration & Society', March 2016

³³ Rijksoverheid (2015): 'New in the Netherlands' (in Dutch 'Nieuw in Nederland'), Webpage: <https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/nieuw-in-nederland/inhoud/inburgering-en-integratie-van-nieuwkomers>

immigrant groups is disproportionately high due to a lack of education, role models and success stories of people in their surroundings.

To tackle youth criminality, the Agenda Integration contains programmes that support early signalling and prevention of criminality and recidivism of ex-convicts using sports, role models and the support of parents. In particular, the role that parents play in their children's education is also seen as crucial. Hence, the policy seeks to improve education skills of parents and their awareness of their role. The idea is to enable parents to set clear boundaries in regards to the violation of core values and to teach their children how they can participate and be self-reliant in the Dutch society. To improve parents' involvement in their children's education the government has reinforced links between parents, professionals and schools, which in return has led to improvements in the school results of children with migration backgrounds.³⁴ When problems (e.g. in education) arise, parents are asked to call for professional aid at an early stage to prevent further exacerbation of these problems.³⁵

Integration pillar 3: Encouraging Interactions with Others and Internalisation of Values

The third pillar of the Dutch integration policy aims to foster a situation in which all Dutch citizens live in a society in which they are equal and determine their own choices. This view is supported by the first article in the Dutch constitution, which calls for equal treatment of all citizens.³⁶ The constantly changing Dutch society demands continuous discussions on pluralism and citizenship (core values).

However, to allow for peaceful communal life the core values of the Dutch democratic state are made concrete and explicit. For example, to raise awareness about codes of conduct and unwritten rules in the Netherlands, schools have implemented citizenship education programmes. To make sure that Dutch citizens do not feel constraint in their freedom the government has developed an action plan to improve awareness of citizens' rights to make their own decisions about education, religion and choice of partner.

Furthermore, the government has developed a national interdisciplinary action programme to combat discrimination.³⁷ Anti-discrimination initiatives have been designed to raise awareness about the negative effects of discrimination and to improve the approach of municipalities to tackle discrimination, and those of societal organisations and employers. Additionally, these initiatives aim to strengthen the resilience of communities and young people, the accessibility of help services and the willingness to report discrimination.

Finally, the government addresses social tensions between different groups. Since this focus point also concerns radicalisation, we will describe it in more detail. Social tensions between

³⁴ The Netherlands (2013): Ministry SAE: Agenda Integration, p.4

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ The Netherlands, 'The Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands', Article 1

³⁷ The Netherlands (2016): Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations: 'National Action Programme to Combat Discrimination'

different communities are, for example, addressed by enhancing dialogue between these groups, by promoting governmental cooperation with the leaders of these groups and by supporting municipalities in their approach regarding Salafism. Furthermore, the Agenda integration collects information on radicalisation interventions and possible partners for the specific focus point on social tensions. The government, for example, developed the Expertise-unit Social Stability (i.e. ESS) which provides national government, municipalities, professionals, and immigrant communities with information, expertise and practical advice.^{38,39}

The development of the ESS is also supported by The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism.⁴⁰ For this action programme, eight preventative measures were implemented⁴¹: “cooperating with the Muslim community; strengthening of existing networks of local and national key figures; concerned citizens can count on support; support for educational institutions; establishment of an expert centre on social tensions and radicalisation; directed action aimed at radicalising young people in local risk areas; mobilising societal opposition and enhancing resilience against radicalisation and tensions; and social debate about the rules of law.”

Independent Evaluation

Knowledge institutes conduct research on and monitor integration to support the evidence base for the Agenda Integration. They can be viewed as on-going independent evaluation instruments for the Dutch integration policy.⁴² Nonetheless, it remains difficult to evaluate whether an integration policy is effective in integrating groups and in preventing estrangement. The effects of the Dutch integration policy differ across municipalities and neighbourhoods, and are therefore often too complex and context-specific to draw general conclusions.

One of these research knowledge institutes is the *Knowledge platform Integration & Society* (i.e. KIS), which is coordinated by two renowned research institutes, the Verwey-Jonker Institute and Movisie.^{43,44} KIS aspires to create a stable and multiform society, in which there is room for differences. On the basis of research, it provides theoretical and practical advice to national and local policy makers, professionals, immigrant groups and the general public.

³⁸ The Netherlands (2015): Overview of the Progress Agenda Integration

³⁹ Expertise-unit Social Stability (in Dutch Expertise-unit Sociale Stabiliteit) (2016): Webpage: <http://www.socialestabiliteit.nl>

⁴⁰ The Netherlands (2014): Ministry of Security and Justice and Ministry SAE: ‘The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism’, p.18

⁴¹ Ibid., pp.16-20

⁴² TERRA, ‘Site visit: Interview Knowledge Platform Integration & Society’, March 2016

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Knowledge platform Integration & Society (in Dutch Kennisplatform Integratie & Samenleving) (2016): Webpage: <http://www.kis.nl>

KIS holds a portal, signal, public, research and implementation function. It uses research, debates, opinion articles and blogs to gain and apply field knowledge.

The Neighbourhood monitor 'Integration' is also a research and knowledge institute, which delivers updated information about six integration indicators (i.e. age structure, ethnicity, education, employment, living situation and criminality rates) on a local level.⁴⁵ In addition, the Agenda Integration makes use of social research institutes (e.g. the Netherlands Institute for Social Research) which investigate immigrant groups and implement pilot studies to test policies.

In spite of the difficulty of evaluating integration policy, then, the Dutch government partners with research institutes, thereby taking measures to ensure that their policies remain effective and up to date, and allowing input from the general public to be gathered, alerting policy makers to areas in which policy needs to be updated or revised, or where new policies are required to cater to new situations.

⁴⁵ Neighborhood monitor Integration (in Dutch Buurtmonitor Integratie) (2016): Webpage of the Ministry SAE: <http://www.buurtintegratie.nl>

Dutch Integration Policy at a Glance

Positive integration leads to a cohesive society, which is by its very nature resilient to the message of radical groups.

The integration policy's goals are:

- To enhance the participation of immigrants and their self-reliance in the Dutch society
- To generate clarity for those who violate the core values of the Dutch society, by clearly defining boundaries, by improving education and by emphasising the role of parents
- To support the interaction between different communities and the internalisation of societal values

The integration policy's measures include:

- The implementation of programmes that are part of various focus points that aim to achieve the latter goals: implementing an integration (language) course, supporting EU-immigrants, implementing the participation statement, improving employment situations amongst immigrants, improving links between immigrants and social institutions, tackling criminality, improving education, implementing citizenship education, tackling discrimination and finally tackling social tensions
- The development of independent research institutes as on-going evaluation instruments

The principles behind this integration policy are:

- The Dutch government is explicit in stating its pride in Dutch citizens with immigrant backgrounds who contribute to society
- Integration starts with the choice to live in the Netherlands
- All immigrants are expected to build on and to internalise a fundament of shared core values, basic principles, rights and duties of Dutch society
- Established Dutch citizens are encouraged to create positive opportunities for immigrant groups that support their integration
- Within the boundaries of the democratic state, all Dutch citizens share equal rights and are free to live according to their own cultural and religious backgrounds
- Policies are based on recent research findings and evidence and subject to constant evaluation

Blueprint of the Dutch Integration Policy

If we try to derive a blueprint for the Dutch integration policy, which can be used to inform policy makers from other European countries, there are some key elements that need to be taken into account. These are:

- **Taking a values-based approach.** The Dutch integration policy promotes community cohesion, solidarity, tolerance and human rights in its dealing with migrants. This values-based approach acts as a strong primary prevention tool: it prevents grievances and identity crises from growing and helps to build a strong society that is resilient against the victimhood narratives of extremist recruiters.
- **Striking the balance of integration and assimilation.**
 - **Promoting participation and self-reliance.** The provision of integration courses, employment modules and similar programmes by societal support institutions enhances both the independence and active integration of migrants.
 - **Setting boundaries and improving education.** The policy tackles criminality by improving education, setting clear societal boundaries and teaching Dutch core values.
 - **Encouraging interactions with others and internalization of values.** Citizenship education and efforts to help migrants internalise the Dutch values are combined with measures to tackle discrimination and social tensions.
- **Ensuring on-going evaluation.** With the help of knowledge institutes integration programmes are evaluated and pilot studies for integration policies are conducted.

Evidence-Based Policy Advice

Adapting Counter-Extremism Policies to Today's Challenges

Based on our literature research, our experience and our interviews during the site visits we recommend the following strategy, structure, key partners and tactics:

Strategy

1. **Take a full spectrum approach.** As far right wing and Islamist extremist narratives tend to amplify each other, it is important to take a full-spectrum approach which counters all forms of extremism. We advise governments to tackle radicalisation at all the different stages that Moghaddam outlines in his staircase model: this requires a combination of a.) awareness raising and primary prevention policies, b.) targeted prevention and early intervention techniques and c.) deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes.
2. **Tackle the sources of extremism.** Instead of merely fighting the symptoms of extremism through sharp-end measures, counter-extremism policies need to address grievances and identity crises through community cohesion projects while openly challenging the ideologies and narratives that extremist recruiters offer as a solution to vulnerable individuals. They should undermine victimhood narratives, provide alternative narratives and uproot extremist ideologies through open debate and civil-society led campaigns.
3. **Facilitate multi-agency collaboration.** Cooperation and effective communication between national policy makers who define the overall strategy, local authorities who adapt the strategy to local contexts and conditions and frontline workers who are operationally active in implementing the strategy on a day-to-day basis.
4. **Link online and offline counter-extremism.** ISIS has been good at connecting online and offline recruiting and propaganda efforts. Enhancing the interaction of online and offline initiatives can make counter-extremism efforts as a whole more effective.
5. **Support the grassroots:** Grassroots organisations are often better suited as providers of prevention, intervention and deradicalisation services. Programmes which are explicitly run by the government have a much higher threshold for individuals to contact them. Furthermore, grassroots organisations are more credible – and thus more effective – as messengers than government.
6. **Guarantee transparency, accountability and human rights.** A values-based approach that emphasises human rights and a high degree of transparency and establishes reliable checks and balances and impartial evaluation systems is crucial to build relationship of trust with both stakeholders and the general public, which is indispensable for a successful long-term counter-extremism strategy.
7. **Communicate successes.** Communication and public perception are central to the effectiveness of counter-extremism measures. It is important to develop a strong

communication strategy that makes successes of counter-extremism programmes visible.

Structure

1. **De-politicise.** We recommend approaches that go beyond conventional counter-extremism policies and actively engage civil society. In particular, frontline workers⁴⁶ and families⁴⁷ have been increasingly recognised as key players by both academics and experts working in the field of counter-extremism. Taking a multi-stakeholder approach both increases effectiveness and enhances public perception, provided that responsibility divisions and accountabilities are clearly defined and well communicated.
2. **De-securitise.** Taking positive measures rather than negative, law-heavy and repressive measures increases the effectiveness of counter-extremism work and helps to build a positive public image. Sharp-end measures tend to alienate minority communities that feel disproportionately targeted.⁴⁸
3. **Localise.** Both the level and the nature of threats vary across different regions even within one country. Thus, it is important to empower local authorities and key players to adapt to temporary trends and demographic contexts while providing clear instructions so that the defined global vision is maintained and consistently implemented on a local level.
4. **Internationalise.** In order to effectively counter the international jihadist insurgency and the rapid rise of far right extremism across the world we need to enhance international cooperation and create global solutions.

Key Partners

1. **Build public-private partnerships.** Partnering with the private sector, in particular multi-national tech and communications firms, can help to widen the reach of counter-narrative projects and to penetrate the echo chambers of the target audience.⁴⁹
2. **Empower frontline workers and families.** Frontline workers and families can act as important confidants, motivators and influencers to vulnerable people and are therefore crucial partners in counter-extremism work. While the UK's Prevent

⁴⁶ Russell, J. and Theodosiou, A. (2015): 'Counter-Extremism: a Decade from 7/7', *Quilliam*, www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/counter-extremism-a-decade-on-from-7-7.pdf

⁴⁷ Initiatives such as Families Against Terrorism and Extremism (FATE) have brought together families of terrorism victims and families of foreign fighters to join forces in the fight against radicalisation and extremism (<http://www.findfate.org/>).

⁴⁸ Russell, J. and Theodosiou, A. (2015): 'Counter-Extremism: a Decade from 7/7'

⁴⁹ Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (2016): 'Preventing Violent Extremism Online Through Public-Private Partnerships' April 2016, <http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/publications/free/summary-report-panel-discussion-on-preventing-violent-extremism.pdf>.

Strategy has attributed high importance to frontline workers, organic networks such as Families Against Terrorism and Extremism (FATE) have been successful in amplifying the role of families in preventing radicalisation and tackling extremism.

3. **Encourage youth-led initiatives.** Providing young people with a platform and amplifying their voices can help them to initiate grassroots movements and alternative narratives that dissuade their peers from joining extremist groups. Initiatives such as ‘Extremely Together’, recently launched by the Kofi Annan Foundation, demonstrate that young people can play leadership roles in countering extremism.


Tactics

1. **Learn from best practices abroad.** Governments can learn from best practices of the counter-extremism work that is happening across the world. A general awareness of successful policies and lessons learnt as well as responsiveness for new approaches can significantly improve counter-extremism work on both the national and the local level.
2. **Innovate with evidence base.** While there is room for experimentation and innovation in the field of counter-extremism, it is important that novel approaches are informed by the intellectual backbone and evidence base provided in the last decade.
3. **Stay flexible and proactive.** In fast-paced environments where challenges may change on a daily basis. Maintaining flexible structures, staying proactive and developing fast feedback loops and effective silo communication can help to react swiftly to both perceived and *de facto* changes.

TERRA Full-Spectrum Policy Framework

The TERRA toolkit presented a ring model in which the vulnerable individual can be seen as the central circle enclosed in a series of concentric rings, each representing family, friends, professionals and social context in their degree of removal from the individual themselves.

The good practices described in this document can be visualised in a similar way. A positive integration and social cohesion policy provides the general context for primary prevention which works against discrimination and towards resilience and active citizenship. The Prevent strategy offers a framework for targeted prevention on a national level and the Aarhus deradicalisation model delivers a vision of how local governments can provide an integrated approach for tackling radicalisation and for reintegrating those who have been at risk of it. Exit and Hayat work on an individual level, either through families to prevent and tackle radicalisation, or to provide practical support with disengaging and reintegrating for those who have been involved in a radical group.



While each of our four good practice programmes can be implemented as a stand-alone initiative, implementing all four of them would provide a holistic approach to tackling radicalisation. Radicalisation is a highly complex and multi-dimensional issue that needs an equally multi-faceted response. An effective counter-extremism strategy therefore needs to take a full-spectrum approach that combines primary prevention (addressing grievances, enhances civil society resilience), targeted prevention (establishing referral systems and early intervention programmes) and deradicalisation projects.

Level One: National Primary Prevention, Social Cohesion and Integration

Benchmark: The Dutch Integration Policy

1. **Develop a national definition of the term ‘integration’.** This definition should include goals and expected outcomes that correspond with successful integration. Note that definitions should be updated according to the current state of affairs; constant dialogues about the appropriate definition are needed.
2. **Promote both integration and assimilation.** Implement policies and programmes that (1) support immigrants in their participation so that they can rely on themselves, (2) prevent and tackle violations of core societal values by setting boundaries, improving education and emphasising the role of parents, and (3) support positive interactions between groups and the internalisation of core values of the Dutch society. The specific focus point and matching programmes of the Dutch Agenda integration could act as a source for inspiration.
3. **Focus on social tensions.** Implement specific measures that prevent social tensions and radicalisation. The Dutch Expertise-unit Social Stability which practically supports local municipalities, professionals and communities in preventing social tensions and radicalisation and the eight preventive measurements of The Netherlands Comprehensive Action Programme to Combat Jihadism could act as a source of inspiration.
4. **Invest in on-going evaluation mechanisms.** Make sure that integration policies are based on independent evidence. In order to achieve this, we recommend that representatives of the integration policy develop and support independent, neutral and complementing knowledge institutes that generate on-going independent evaluation instruments for their context-specific national integration policy.

Level 2: National Targeted Prevention and Early Intervention

Benchmark: The UK's Prevent Strategy

1. **Develop a comprehensive, coherent and adaptive strategy.** Develop a coherent national extremism prevention policy that tackles all forms of extremism (far right and Islamist, non-violent and violent) and can be adapted to local challenges and risk levels while maintaining a global vision.
2. **Take a long-term approach.** Fight the sources of extremism by addressing all drivers of radicalisation processes: identity crises, grievances, charismatic recruiters, extremist narratives and ideologies.
3. **Define responsibilities.** Find a suitable model for smooth cooperation between national policy makers, local authorities and civil society with clear division of responsibilities and effective inter-agency communication.
4. **Communicate effectively.** Communicate the successes of the prevention programmes, maintain a high degree of transparency and implement a good checks and balances system.
5. **Foster community cohesion.** Prevent identity crisis and grievances through community cohesion programmes, inter-faith dialogue and other primary prevention initiatives in public institutions.
6. **Tackle extremist narratives and networks.** Undermine the networks and channels of extremist recruiters and encourage grassroots initiatives to counter their narratives and openly challenge their ideologies.
7. **Invest in education.** Train and encourage frontline workers to raise awareness about extremist narratives, to teach critical thinking skills and to detect and react to radicalisation processes. Providing education and raising the awareness of vulnerable individuals can help to promote community cohesion and enhance resilience against extremists' communication strategies.
8. **Develop early intervention mechanisms.** Establish a referral programme for individuals who show signs of radicalisation, use an impartial, interdisciplinary panel to determine the referred individual's degree of vulnerability and adapt both content and timeframe of radicalisation prevention and deradicalisation programmes to the needs of each individual.

Level 3: Local Deradicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration

Benchmark: The Aarhus Model

1. **Foster dialogue and trust.** Create a framework for local cooperation that is based on dialogue, guidance and mentoring. Building trust between all stakeholders is indispensable for the effectiveness of any programme; in particular, on-going dialogue with minority communities and vulnerable individuals is crucial.
2. **Strengthen multi-agency cooperation.** Close cooperation between local authorities, police and frontline workers is important to deliver a comprehensive and effective local counter-extremism programme.
3. **Provide information and promote education.** Making information about radicalisation easily accessible, raising awareness and offering workshops to both professionals and vulnerable individuals can be an effective strategy to prevent radicalisation.
4. **Create adaptable deradicalisation programmes.** Develop deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes that can be adapted to the radicalisation stage and tailored to the specific needs of individuals.
5. **Ensure transparency and smart communication.** Keep the highest possible level of transparency without compromising the privacy of beneficiaries of the programme. Carefully choose the channels and messengers for your communication with the general public.

Level 4: Grassroots Intervention, Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation

Benchmark: The Hayat and Exit Programmes

1. **Use one-to-one intervention.** Consider supporting grassroots programmes which deliver intervention services on a one-to-one, individual level. These might include counseling services, practical support and family support organisations.
2. **Ensure professional delivery.** All sensible support and intervention services should be provided by professional therapists, psychologists or social workers. It is important that good quality checks and evaluation systems are in place to ensure the protection of vulnerable individuals.
3. **Facilitate inter-agency collaboration.** Any civil society-led initiative will function optimally when it is not operating alone, but embedded in bigger structures that facilitate collaboration with schools, police, and local and national government.
4. **Keep relationships transparent.** A relationship between any such services and law enforcement services needs to be established, documented and communicated in a transparent way to the target group as well as the general public.
5. **Fund but don't publicise.** While it is fully appropriate – and indeed advisable – for government bodies to fund grassroots initiatives, as they deliver such a vital contribution to security, the programme should not be publicised as a government programme. Presenting it in this way may create resistance amongst the target

group. Thus, careful thought needs to be given, therefore, to the positioning of the programme within government policy.

Conclusion

We hope that within this document we have provided some initial guidelines as to how an effective multi-layer approach to counter-extremism may look. Further research would be necessary in order to fully document the working methods of each of these good practices – producing guidelines or handbooks for mentors, for example, to support a system comparable to the one used in Aarhus, or for practitioners involved in a family support programme such as Hayat. However, the good functioning of the practices described here indicate which areas would benefit from the attention of policy makers in European countries, and give some indication of the potential scope of a comprehensive programme which encompasses all four levels.

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